Navigating the Path to Biosecurity: Reflections on the third BWC Working Group Meeting 2023
From: Neha Suresh (iGEM NCSU and iGEM Community Project Head)
“The world faces a biological weapons threat that is real, serious, and, in many respects, growing.....We cannot keep treading water.”- Bonnie Jenkins, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
The statement by US Undersecretary Bonnie Jenkins at the 2020 BWC Meeting of States Parties encapsulated the growing urgency of strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention after two decades of stagnation. Her remarks set the stage for establishing the BWC Working Group in December 2023.
I had the opportunity to attend this Working group as part of the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) 2023 youth delegation. In this article, I have summarized creative insights from formal and informal discussions, as well as side events held during this period.
As the Working Group convened, compliance and verification brought us face-to-face with the complexities of global collaboration on arms control. In the BWC context, ‘verification refers to processes and procedures to assess treaty commitments - allowing demonstration of compliance, building confidence in obligations fulfillment, and deterring violations.’ An effective system would involve tailored, mutually-reinforcing tools to meet biological monitoring challenges.
The recent discussions marked the launch of a conceptual debate on these issues following an extended impasse. Fundamental questions were raised to promote shared understanding moving ahead. Maintaining openness to new ideas will be vital as the process advances towards the 2024 benchmark for recommendations.Above all, the session signified the beginning of a course correction after years of ineffective "treading water" as highlighted in Jenkins’ call for action.
Recommendations for Verification
Trust-Building: Verification discussions reflected a desire for enhanced confidence-building measures under the BWC. Despite procedural difficulties, commitment remains to strengthen the Convention's prohibition on biological weapons.
Seize Opportunities for Positive Disarmament: This represents a unique opening to bring positivity into disarmament efforts through preventive diplomacy. Cultivating leadership that patiently guides all nations towards a shared goal of bio weapons disarmament, which can pave the way for lasting change.
Strengthening Compliance Architecture: A spectrum of compliance concerns exist - from accidental lapses to substantive violations. A layered verification system would allow proportional responses, whether administrative corrections or major investigations. Potential measures suggested include auditing biosecurity governance standards, continuous genetic sequence monitoring, and flexible on-site inspections.
Incremental Improvements: Rather than an elusive single sweeping mechanism. A "Good Verification" framework could start with auditing, red flag triggers and rapid investigation protocols, closing critical gaps while respecting political constraints. Experts outlined staging verification via distributed sensors, open-source intelligence, microbial forensics and outbreak analytics.
Invest in Predictive Capabilities: Integrating diverse data sources and predictive technologies will fortify the BWC regime against emerging risks.Integrating technologies like AI into assistance efforts enhances real-time monitoring. Formal links with health security authorities reinforces the ecosystem. Incentivizing whistleblowing protections and supporting biosafety best practices adoption further strengthens norms.
For example, big data analysis can generate baseline expectations of normal biotech activity and flag anomalies warranting transparency inquiries. Wastewater metagenomic sequencing enables outbreak tracing and bio attack early warning.
These recommendations recognize that realizing equitable and inclusive BWC outcomes demands accounting for disparate national capacities. Capacity building to enable developing countries to implement verification protocols promotes universal adherence and participation.
By strengthening compliance infrastructure across all member states through collaborative capacity building, the Convention can move towards its fundamental mission of international peace and security.
Alternate methods to verification
The lengthy impasse in negotiations on a BWC verification protocol highlights deeply entrenched challenges in adopting traditional arms control mechanisms for biological disarmament. A flexible approach with a mixture of the below measures could enhance BWC resilience, while a consensus on verification methods is reached.
Leverage Complementary Institutions: Tangibly engaging international health/security organizations like WHO, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and FAO in "One Health" surveillance cooperation across human, animal and plant sectors is prudent.
Encourage Scientist-to-Scientist Cooperation: Human-to-human and scientist-to-scientist collaborative goodwill and academic exchanges are powerful tools, highlighting the importance of preventing hostile uses of biology.
Counter Secrecy Through Transparency: The internet's information flows can enable BWC states to publicly share data. Though tempering expectations on verification breakthroughs, transparency initiatives still hold promise.
Civil society may be key to the BWC
Arguably the greatest latent asset for strengthening the BWC regime lies with activating empowered civil society voices more centrally in decision-making. Despite extensive capabilities, NGO access remains ad-hoc and not institutionalized. Formally including diverse science, policy, awareness-building and monitoring insights from civil society groups would catalyze biological risk reduction.
Yet outdated notions of expertise dominate, clinging to state-centric policymaking rather than embracing collaborative networked action. BWC state parties must recognize legitimate civil society roles in collectively shaping the treaty’s future evolution. Envisioning biological security futures, civil society constitutes a key governing stakeholder. This inclusion fosters a culture of responsibility across sectors, ensuring BWC aspirations reach beyond diplomatic corridors.
While alternate methods and civil society inclusion build resilience, concrete verification mechanisms remain indispensable in a world where biological threats transcend borders. As the BWC regime evolves, the integration of verified compliance, innovative measures, and civil society participation will be essential for its effectiveness in safeguarding global biosecurity.
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